Sensationalism (from the 17th-century Latin sensatio, derived from the ancient Latin sensus, meaning “sense”) refers to a tendency in the media to exaggerate or overemphasise certain news stories in order to attract public attention. This editorial tactic often emphasises emotion, shock or scandal at the expense of balanced reporting, in contrast to the principle of journalistic neutrality and thorough investigation. Sensationalist reporting can blow up trivial events and present them as having a significant social impact, or it can provide distorted coverage of important issues, often in a trivial or tabloid style. This tendency deviates from conventional journalistic standards, which generally aim to avoid bias and strive for factual presentation.
In philosophy, sensationalism refers to a particular doctrine within empiricism, which holds that all knowledge is derived from sensory experiences – such as colours, sounds, heat or pressure – without any innate ideas. This approach places experience and sensory data as primary, in contrast to both sensism, which sees sensation as the sole source of knowledge, and rationalism, which claims that reason itself, not sensation, is the basis of certain knowledge.
Throughout history, thinkers such as John Locke, David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and philosophers such as Descartes, Francis Bacon and John Stuart Mill have explored these ideas under the umbrella of empiricism, debating the sources and reliability of human knowledge. Key figures such as Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius were at the forefront of empiricism, advocating a philosophy rooted in sensory experience, often excluding metaphysical or idealistic considerations. Their theories were part of a broader philosophical inquiry into how humans come to understand the reality around them, and while each thinker came to different conclusions, they agreed that sensory experience was essential to the acquisition of knowledge.
Étienne Bonnot de Condillac: sensation and the growth of the mind
Condillac’s Treatise on Sensations (1754) provides a fundamental examination of knowledge derived solely from sensation. Building on John Locke’s distinction between ideas of sensation (derived from the external world) and ideas of reflection (the mind’s contemplation of its own processes), Condillac asserts that reflection is not an independent source of knowledge; rather, all mental operations – from memory to abstract thought – are transformations of sensations.
To illustrate this progression, Condillac introduces the metaphor of a marble statue, initially devoid of ideas or desires, symbolising a pure, untainted mind – a true tabula rasa. As each sense is sequentially activated, the statue begins to acquire sensations that, over time, transform into increasingly complex mental operations. This gradual awakening from sensation to cognition underscores Condillac’s belief that external sensations fuel all mental functions. In his view, the sense of touch in particular plays a crucial role in bridging perception and external reality, allowing the statue to distinguish itself from the outside world. Thus, Condillac posits that tactile experiences ultimately lead to the development of self-awareness, in line with Cartesian insights into the self and existence.
Ernst Mach: sensations as elements of reality
Ernst Mach’s The Analysis of Sensations (1886) offers a perspective that defies the positivist trend of his time, which treated science as a quasi-magical force capable of uncovering hidden truths. Mach claims that what we call “bodies” or “objects” do not exist in themselves, but are composites of sensations – colours, sounds, pressures and other sensory data – organised into a continuous stream. He prefers to call these sensory data “elements” to avoid reducing them to mere subjective experiences. For Mach, sensations do not serve as symbols for objects; rather, they themselves constitute the reality we perceive.
This view distances Mach’s philosophy from traditional phenomenalism, such as that proposed by George Berkeley. Whereas Berkeley argued that reality consists solely of perceptions sustained by a divine observer, Mach’s approach treats sensory elements as objective data structures rather than psychological projections. He argues that phenomena are best understood independently of the self, an idea that foreshadows the positivist turn towards scientific objectivity. In Mach’s model, knowledge and interpretation emerge from the relations between sensations, without the assumption of a metaphysical substratum.
Richard Avenarius: pure experience and the unity of sensation
Building on positivist principles, Richard Avenarius introduced empiriocriticism, a philosophy that examines “pure experience” without dividing it into physical or psychic realms. In his view, human experience of the world is fundamentally unified, based on a seamless interaction between the individual and the environment. This fundamental unity, Avenarius argues, existed before philosophical distinctions created artificial separations between self and world, object and subject.
Avenarius’ philosophy thus departs from classical empiricism, which emphasises the individual’s sensory perception as the basis of knowledge, by focusing instead on the communal experience of reality. For Avenarius, both the environment and the self are composed of the same sensory elements, differentiated only by context and the individual’s responses to these elements. In this framework, cognitive processes are adaptations – physiological responses to external stimuli – mediated by the nervous system. Avenarius argues that knowledge progresses towards simplicity and unity rather than complexity, with the ‘principle of economy’ guiding the formulation of concepts, theories and scientific laws. His theories influenced early 20th-century gnoseology and anticipated some of the tenets of the Vienna Circle, marking a shift in philosophical thought towards the unification of sensory experience and objective inquiry.
In essence, the works of Condillac, Mach and Avenarius reflect a deepening exploration of how sensations shape human understanding of reality. They extend the legacy of empiricism by advancing the view that knowledge, self-knowledge, and objectivity are rooted in the perceptual mechanisms through which individuals engage with the world. Each philosopher, in his own way, has sought to define a model of consciousness that reconciles subjective sensation with an objective, shared reality.